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Abstract 
For a long time, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been seen as the privileged 
multilateral regime to regulate trade. However, given its slow progress in negotiating new trade 
rules, countries have increasingly shifted their focus to preferential trade agreements (PTAs) 
since the early 2000s. Focusing on a timely and increasingly important topic (digital trade) we 
explore how countries’ interactions in the WTO impacts on their approaches in designing rules 
in PTAs. Using newly collected data on digital trade-related provisions in almost 350 PTAs 
signed since 2000, we find that countries’ participation in digital trade-related initiatives at the 
WTO spill over to the design of their PTAs. More precisely, we show that countries which 
actively participate in the discussions of the WTO Work Programme on Electronic Commerce 
are more likely to negotiate ambitious commitments on digital trade in their PTAs. 
Furthermore, our analysis indicates that countries which participate in the WTO-based 
plurilateral Information Technology Agreement (ITA) are more likely to commit to deeper 
cooperation in the area of digital trade. More broadly, this article contributes to our 
understanding of the dynamics of regime complexity and how interaction in the multilateral 
system is associated with regional and bilateral trade regimes. 
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1 Regime complexity in international trade 
Regime complexity has characterized the international trading system for quite some time 
(Alter and Meunier, 2009; Alter and Raustiala, 2018). Legal scholars have generally 
contributed to a narrative of hierarchy between multilateral and regional rules, basing their 
assessment on the constitution of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO interprets 
regional trade arrangements, such as preferential trade agreements (PTAs), as exceptions to the 
guiding principles of the Geneva-based system: non-discrimination and the most-favourite-
nations clause. Another narrative has focused on overlapping and non-hierarchical regimes 
instead. This has led to a number of studies on the strategic usage of forum-shopping and its 
consequences (Busch, 2007; Alter and Meunier, 2009). The second narrative has received more 
traction over time, yet, the attention has moved on to study the specific relationship between 
multilateralism and preferentialism. Are these approaches complements, substitutes, or do they 
produce fragmentation of international trade law? 
Certainly the recent surge of PTAs has been another defining moment in this debate (Bown, 
2017). Today, every WTO Member has at least one PTA whereas some WTO Members have 
more than 50 such agreements. And the process does not stop there as PTAs increasingly 
undergo re-negotiations or modernizations. Therefore, the narrative on “PTAs as exceptions” 
has further lost traction. At the same time, systematic evidence that PTAs have undermined the 
WTO system and have led to substantial fragmentation is also lacking. On the contrary, some 
recent work on the WTO-PTA linkage suggests that WTO law is well embedded in PTAs and 
that this is in particular true for active signatories of PTAs (Allee and Elsig, 2019; Allee et al., 
2017). 
While PTAs are on the rise, attention on rules for digital trade has also increased in recent 
years. They are part of “behind-the-border” regulations that affect trade in goods and services 
as well as investment flows. Yet, digital trade rules are not only about goods or services that 
are provided electronically, but about how to deal with data that is embodied in various steps 
of the product cycle more generally: from marketing, design, production, product and service 
delivery towards after-sales activities. 
Early versions of this debate entered the WTO in the late 1990s when the Information 
Technology Agreement (ITA) was reached in 1996 and the WTO Work Programme on 
Electronic Commerce was established in 1998. The ITA is a plurilateral agreement, or what 
Hoekman and Sabel (2019) refer to as a “critical mass agreement”, that was initially signed by 
a group of 29 WTO members (including the then 15 European Union members as one entity) 
who committed to completely eliminate tariffs on the 201 sector-identified information 
technology (IT) products covered in the agreement. Collectively, the ITA participants account 
for approximately 90 percent of global trade in the products covered (Wilkinson et al., 2016). 
The WTO Work Programme on Electronic Commerce was put into place to explore the 
relationship between existing WTO agreements and the growing importance of e-commerce. 
E-commerce or what has become known more recently as “digital trade” poses many regulatory 
questions.1 What stand out are questions related to data protection and privacy on the one hand 
and free flow of data on the other hand. Data flows further pose challenges to regulators in 
particular in cases where PTA parties have very different levels of domestic law and protection; 
in some countries we find even a lack of regulation. Data also comes in various forms and their 
sheer quantity poses an additional challenge for the implementation of laws both internally but 
also extra-territorially. We can observe different initiatives and strategies to regulate digital 
trade, e.g. the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) rules out local storage 
requirements to allow the free flow of data, whereas the European Union (EU) through its new 
EU data protection laws is unilaterally exporting and enforcing EU law worldwide. 
As we see with the example of the USMCA, the newer generation of PTAs has started to 
include digital trade provisions in PTAs whereas little progress is visible in multilateral 
negotiations.2 This leads to the observation that PTAs have become the real game in town as 
far as international cooperation in digital trade regulation is concerned. The example of the 
export of EU law suggests that some actors and governments are not only setting standards 
unilaterally, but most likely will work towards enshrining these laws in PTAs to help diffuse 
digital trade-related standards.3 
Our contribution to this special issue is to sharpen our understanding of the dynamics of regime 
complexity by investigating how activities in one forum (the WTO) spill over to the regional 
forum (here PTAs). By choosing digital trade, we focus on a relatively new topic where so far 
systematic data was missing. Our article explores this WTO-PTA linkage and tests various 
explanations to account for PTA design. We use a novel database that codes digital trade-
related provisions in 347 PTAs. 
We find that signatories of the most prominent digital trade-related WTO agreement so far (the 
ITA) and those WTO Members most active in WTO Committees related to the Electronic 
Commerce Work Programme tend to have the deepest provisions on digital trade in PTAs. 
These findings suggest that the WTO has an impact beyond the actual treaty commitments and 
can shape the content of PTAs. Our analysis further shows that trade flows in IT products, 
domestic exposure to digital trade and whether the US is a PTA partner matter for ambitious 
PTA commitments in this area. 
The article is structured as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the literature on the 
WTO-PTA linkage and, in particular, past research on this relationship related to digital trade. 
Based on the research gaps discussed, we then provide an argument about how rule-making 
and committee work in the WTO may spill over to PTA negotiations and eventually design 
outcomes in section three. In section four we present parts of a novel database and describe our 
variables of interest. In section five we test our hypotheses and discuss the empirical results. 
Section six concludes. 
 
2 Literature 
There have been numerous studies that focus on how the WTO and PTAs compete and co-exist 
as platforms for negotiations or dispute settlement (Baldwin, 2006; Busch, 2007). Given the 
lack of progress in WTO negotiations, relatively few studies have, however, systematically 
explored how PTA design is affected by WTO law. Some case studies provide evidence on 
spill-overs from WTO law and practices to regional trade agreements such as Mercosur (Arnold 
and Rittberger, 2006). In the first systematic study on the extent to which the WTO is “present” 
in PTAs, Allee et al. (2017) examine textual over-laps of legal provisions. They find both large 
amounts of copy-pasting and substantial references to WTO articles in PTAs. Overall, the 
authors stress the significant presence of WTO commitments and how PTA law re-enforces 
and supports WTO law. This work suggests a less conflict-laden competition between WTO 
and PTA commitments than often argued. The authors further find that in particular established 
areas of trade regulation (e.g. trade remedies) are imported more from WTO law than newer 
areas (e.g. procurement, investment) and that the important trade powers (those that also have 
the means to depart from WTO obligations) are importing WTO law commitments well above 
average. Another recent study on PTA design focuses on how participation and experience in 
WTO dispute settlement shapes PTA negotiations and outcomes.  Wüthrich and Elsig (2019) 
develop an argument about how PTA partners learn from participation in dispute settlement 
proceedings of the WTO. In particular, import-competing sectors critically review WTO cases 
lost by their government which spill over to PTA design in form of additional flexibility 
instruments. 
The WTO-PTA linkage related to digital trade has also received little attention so far. Most 
research has focused on either the work at the WTO related to e-commerce negotiations or on 
PTA chapters on digital trade. Wunsch-Vincent (2004), for instance, shows that early 
discussions in the WTO on this topic were primarily driven by a small group of developed 
countries including Australia, the EU, Japan and the US. Wunsch-Vincent and Hold (2016) 
point out that some limited progress was made on issues such as the classification of the content 
of certain electronic transmissions, development-related issues, fiscal implications of e-
commerce, the relationship between e-commerce and traditional forms of commerce, the 
imposition of customs duties on electronic transmissions, competition, jurisdiction and 
applicable law and other legal issues.4 The literature also suggests that the attention has shifted 
over time from the WTO to PTAs as the prime location for rule-making resulting from 
diverging interests among WTO Members. In line with increasing politicization in the context 
of the WTO, we also witness PTA commitments that vary considerably (Wunsch-Vincent and 
Hold, 2016; Wu, 2017).5 To a certain extent, the diverging PTA templates reflect what 
Aaronson and Leblond (2018) refer to as a “new digital divide”. The authors argue that China, 
the EU and the US have established three distinct data realms with different approaches to data 
governance. These patterns of divergence are also identified by other recent studies including 
contributions by Gao (2018), Sen (2018), Azmeh et al. (2019) and Ferencz and Gonzales 
(2019). 
 
3 Argument 
This section develops an argument about WTO-PTA linkage that has not received sufficient 
scholarly attention. So far, the contributions that focus on that relationship are mostly focused 
on established WTO law and dispute settlement activities shaping PTA treaty texts. There is 
evidence that PTAs often build on legal concepts and language found in the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and other 
WTO agreements when referring to “legitimate policy objective” or “disguised restriction on 
trade”. This applies also to digital trade (Wu, 2017). Recent work, however, does not 
sufficiently take into account how day-to-day WTO work and agreement directly touching on 
digital trade are related to PTA commitments. We attempt to address this research gap. 
We assume that the WTO can serve as an important platform for the tabling of proposals for 
new rules. The main actors in ongoing exchanges are WTO Members themselves. Past work 
on the WTO has shown how influential the official government delegations are as actors in 
Geneva. The organization has rightly been called “member-driven” (Elsig, 2010). In other 
words, trade diplomats are actively shaping and overseeing the work of the WTO, in particular 
through Committees and informal and formal negotiations. Most proposals are directly tabled 
by WTO Members in the appropriate technical Committees.  
There is evidence that this work then is taken on board in subsequent PTA negotiations. We 
know from studies that focus on other types of behind-the-border rules that WTO Committee 
work can influence PTA design. In a study of 124 PTAs, for example, Lejárraga  (2013)  finds  
that  many  of  the  WTO-plus  provisions  on  transparency in sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures (SPS) emanated from recommended procedures for implementing the transparency 
obligation issues by the WTO SPS Committee. Similarly, many of the WTO-plus provisions 
for Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) stem from the recommendations of the WTO TBT 
Committee. In a more recent analysis of 260 PTAs, McDaniels et al. (2018) also find that the 
design of PTA TBT chapters is linked to the work and decisions taken in the WTO TBT 
Committee. In the area of digital trade, there is some anecdotal evidence that this mechanism 
may also be in place. In the context of the WTO Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, 
the concept of “technical neutrality” was largely debated in WTO Committees, which later 
found expression in trade agreements such as in the EU-Japan Free Trade Agreement.6 
Building on this, we develop our first hypothesis. We conjecture that the spill-over effect may 
be particularly strong when WTO Members are not only present in Geneva, but when they 
actively shape digital trade discussions and formulate country positions. The more actively 
involved negotiators are, the greater is also their personal standing in the diplomatic community 
and the greater the buy-in effects of negotiation outcomes overall (see Elsig and Milewicz, 
2017). This exposure to WTO daily work is important as it is not unusual that trade diplomats 
serving in Geneva have gone back to negotiating trade agreements after their postings in 
Geneva. Even a Korean Member of the Appellate Body terminated his term early in 2017 to be 
in charge of the re-negotiations of the US-Korea trade negotiations. Therefore, our first 
hypothesis reads: 
H1: The more active a WTO Member is in digital trade-related discussions at the WTO, the 
more likely the WTO Member is to commit to deeper cooperation in digital trade in its PTAs. 
Besides an effect on PTAs through WTO Committee work, we also expect the decision of 
WTO Members to join existing international agreements that focus on digital trade to spill-
over to PTA design. Ratifying such international agreements under the auspice of the WTO 
signals a commitment to negotiate PTAs with digital trade-related provisions. Even if countries 
have not been actively involved in the negotiations, the signing of a WTO agreement can 
provide important impetus to be actively shaping the PTA agenda. In addition, agreeing to 
pluri- or multilateral treaties may already have tempered lobby groups at home that are 
sceptical vis-à-vis pursuing liberalization strategies when it comes to data-relevant provisions 
(Claussen, 2019). We therefore expect agreements such as the previously discussed ITA to play 
an important role in this context and phrase our second hypothesis more generally as follows: 
H2: A WTO Member that signed digital trade-related WTO agreements is more likely to 
commit to deeper cooperation in digital trade in its PTAs. 
 
4 Data and methodology 
In order to test above hypotheses, our empirical analysis relies on the “Trade Agreement 
Provisions on E-commerce and Data Flows” (TAPED) database recently published by Burri 
and Polanco (2020). Based on the “Design of Trade Agreements” (DESTA) database (Dür et 
al., 2014), TAPED identifies 347 PTAs signed between 2000 and 2019, starting two years after 
the WTO Work Programme on Electronic Commerce was established. 183 of the 347 PTAs 
(52%) contain provisions that directly or indirectly regulate digital trade. In total, 99 relevant 
provisions related to e-commerce, intellectual property, key services sectors, government 
procurement and trade in goods are included in the TAPED database. A detailed codebook can 
be found in Burri and Polanco (2020). 
For each of these provisions, Burri and Polanco (2020) also assess the degree of legalization 
and group provisions into soft, mixed and hard commitments. Soft commitments are not 
enforceable by the PTA parties and include so-called ’best-effort’ provisions such as those 
’recognizing the importance’, ’working towards’ or ’promoting’ a certain objective. Hard 
commitments, by contrast, oblige a PTA party to comply with a provision or principle and are 
enforceable through a dispute settlement system. These provisions tend to contain terms such 
as ’shall’ or ’must’. A provision is considered of mixed legalization if it entails both soft and 
hard commitments. 
4.1 Dependent variables 
Based on the TAPED dataset, we construct our dependent variables to measure the degree of 
digital trade-related commitments. We follow the approach of Dür et al. (2014) and Baccini et 
al. (2015) and construct different measures of depth of cooperation. Our first dependent 
variable, Depth, is an additive index of the 99 provisions related to digital trade that reflect a 
certain obligation. Depth, however, does not take into account the degree of legalization of the 
99 provisions. The PTA with the highest Depth is the USMCA, followed by Australia-
Singapore (2016) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (CPTPP, 2018). 
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of PTAs signed since 2000. The left y-axis shows the 
cumulative number of signed PTAs as well as the cumulative number of PTAs that include 
provisions related to digital trade. The right y-axis shows the average annual Depth of these 
PTAs. Even though the annual average Depth of PTAs fluctuates, there is a clear trend towards 
increasing Depth of digital trade-related provisions. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here.] 
In our second dependent variable, Weighted Depth, we account for the legalization of 
provisions. To construct this variable, we follow Hicks and Kim (2012) and weigh soft and 
mixed provisions with 0.5 and hard provisions with 1 and then create an additive index. 
Weighted Depth provides a more nuanced picture of the enforceability of PTA provisions 
related to digital trade. Both variables, Depth and Weighted Depth, however, have the 
shortcoming that they consider every provision as equally important for the respective additive 
index.   
Recent studies, including Orefice and Rocha (2014), Dür et al. (2014) and Baccini et al. (2015), 
attempt to overcome this issue by employing factor and principal component analysis. In line 
with this literature, we follow Dür et al. (2014) and employ a Rasch model to construct our 
third dependent variable.7 Rasch models are particularly applicable to binary data. In our case, 
the Rasch model assumes that all provisions (which are binary – present in a PTA or not) 
capture one underlying latent dimension. The provisions, however, contribute more or less to 
this latent dimension. More precisely, provisions that are relatively rare in PTAs contribute 
more to Depth than provisions that are relatively common in PTAs. Figure 2 provides an 
illustration of the provisions and their frequency in PTAs. We refer to this variable as Rasch 
Depth. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here.] 
4.2 Explanatory variables 
In order to assess the impact of the WTO interaction (in form of negotiations and specific 
treaties) on the design of digital trade-related cooperation in PTAs, we collect new data and 
create two specific variables. 
The first variable relates to active participation in Committee work at the WTO on digital trade. 
Already at its second Ministerial Conference in Geneva in 1998, the WTO adopted “The 
Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce” and established the Work Programme on 
Electronic Commerce. The e-commerce related discussions were agreed to take place in the 
Council on Trade in Goods, the Council on Trade in Services, the Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights Council and the Committee on Trade and Development. The General Council 
was tasked to keep the Work Programme under constant review. To construct our first variable 
of interest, WTO Ecommerce Interventions, we searched the meeting minutes of the Councils 
(WTO, 2019) and collected WTO Members’ interventions on e-commerce until the end of 
2018. In total, we analyzed 165 meeting minutes from the Council on Trade in Goods, 150 
meeting minutes from the Council on Trade in Services, 131 meeting minutes from the Trade 
Related Intellectual Property Rights Council, 114 meeting minutes from the Committee on 
Trade and Development and 254 meeting minutes from the General Council. 
As illustrated in Figure 3, the topic of e-commerce attracted a lot of attention among the WTO 
Members in the first few years after the establishment of the Work Programme. From 2002 
onwards, however, e-commerce was rarely discussed in the responsible Councils. In 2011, the 
topic began to receive increasing attention again. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here.] 
Our variable of interest, WTO Ecommerce Interventions, captures the cumulative count of 
WTO Members’ e-commerce-related interventions in the responsible Councils between 1998 
(the establishment of the Work Programme) and the year of PTA signature. Since the unit of 
our empirical analysis is at the PTA level, the average of this count is calculated for the parties 
of a given PTA. We expect that countries which have often intervened on digital trade-related 
topics in the WTO, also include more and deeper digital trade-related provisions in their PTAs. 
Our second explanatory variable captures agreed commitments of WTO Members in digital 
trade-related rules. The only concluded agreement in the WTO so far that aims to liberalize 
digital trade-related products is the previously described ITA. The ITA was reached through 
the “Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Technology Products” at the WTO Ministerial 
Conference held in Singapore in 1996. By now, 82 countries have signed the ITA which 
demands from its signatories to completely eliminate tariffs on IT products covered in the 
agreement. These products include computers, telecommunication equipment, semiconductors, 
semi- conductor manufacturing and testing equipment, software, scientific instruments, as well 
as most of the parts and accessories of these products. In 2012, a group of six ITA signatories, 
including Costa Rica, the EU, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the US, officially launched 
negotiations to expand the ITA. The negotiations concluded in 2015 at the WTO Ministerial 
Conference held in Nairobi. Since only 30 PTAs were signed since then, we rely on the 
signatories of the initial ITA to construct our second explanatory variable of interest: ITA 
Members Percent. This variable captures the percentage of PTA parties that are ITA 
signatories. Since ITA signatories are committed to liberalizing the trade of IT products, we 
expect them to also commit to deeper cooperation in the regulation digital trade in PTAs. To 
disentangle the importance of the ITA from WTO membership effect, we also include the 
percentage of PTA parties that are WTO Members (WTO Members Percent) in our empirical 
analysis. 
4.3 Control variables 
Our empirical analysis includes a battery of variables that account for alternative explanations 
for PTA treaty design and some control variables that are regularly found in studies on PTA 
design to control for confounding factors. 
The first variable relates to the importance of digital trade flows. In particular, new areas of 
trade regulation, such as digital trade, allow for the design of ambitious templates which reflect 
countries’ competitiveness in a growing sector. We expect that countries which trade a lot in 
digital trade-related products are likely to opt for deeper commitments in PTAs. While it is 
undisputed that digital trade flows have rapidly grown over the last years, finding a 
comprehensive data source which covers multiple years and countries presents a challenge. To 
construct our variable, we rely on a dataset kindly shared by Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan and Henn 
(2018) on the trade of products included in the ITA. For each PTA member, we sum its imports 
and exports of ITA products to compute its total trade in ITA products. As the unit of analysis 
is the PTA level, we then calculate the average of all PTA members and apply a log-
transformation analogous to Copelovitch and Putnam (2014). We call this variable ITA Trade.8  
A second variable of interest relates to existing domestic policies on digital trade. We expect 
that the more advanced countries’ domestic policies are, the more likely they are to agree to 
ambitious cooperation in their PTAs. The lack of available data sources is a challenge in this 
context, too. The Global Cyberlaw Tracker of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD, 2020), for instance, covers the current state of e-commerce 
legislation in the fields of e-transactions, consumer protection, data protection/privacy and 
cybercrime adoption in 194 countries. While this is an interesting snapshot of the current 
legislative landscape, the dataset includes no information on previous years. Promising work 
is also conducted by Ferracane et al. (2018). The authors create a Digital Trade Restrictiveness 
Index (DTRI) and assess 64 countries in terms of their fiscal, establishment, data and trading 
restrictions. Similar to the UNCTAD dataset, however, the DTRI does not include a time 
dimension and is therefore not suitable to our analysis of PTAs signed since the year 2000. To 
proxy for countries’ domestic policies and digital readiness, we rely on the World Bank (2020) 
data on the percentage of population using the internet to construct the variable Internet Users. 
We expect that more digitally restrictive countries have a lower percentage of population using 
the internet. To check our expectation, we correlated our Internet Users variable with the DTRI 
and found a negative correlation coefficient of 0.5, which provides us with additional 
confidence in our choice of a proxy variable.9 Internet Users is averaged over the parties of a 
given PTA since the level of analysis is at the PTA level. We expect that this percentage is 
positively associated with countries’ willingness to commit to deeper digital trade-related 
cooperation in their PTAs. 
A third variable of interest relates to the alleged divide between the digital trade strategies of 
the EU, US and China (Aaronson and Leblond, 2018). It is well documented that the three 
powers have strong views on the regulation of e-commerce and data flows and as a 
consequence they may attempt to instrumentalize the PTA network for the export of their 
models which would be reflected by deeper commitments.10 We therefore include the three 
binary variables EU, US, and CHN, which are equal to one if one of the countries is a PTA 
party and zero otherwise. 
In line with the existing literature, we include a number of additional control variables in our 
empirical analysis. Powerful countries, for instance, might be more eager to agree on more 
ambitious commitments in digital trade. To control for PTA members’ economic size, we 
include their gross domestic product (GDP, constant 2010 US$) and, as the unit of analysis is 
at the PTA level, calculate the log-transformed average GDP for each PTA. As is common in 
the literature on PTA design, we also control for PTA members’ power asymmetries. Stronger 
trading nations are not only able to dictate the negotiations but are likely attempting to export 
their regulatory philosophies to weaker states. Powerful states may dominate bilateral trade 
talks and, in particular, the enforcement of the agreed trade law provisions. At the same time a 
weaker PTA party knows how important digital trade-related provisions are for the larger PTA 
party and that this could lead to more investments and potential increased integration into 
global value chains. We therefore expect that weaker countries are accepting the demands of 
the stronger PTA party. In addition to economic size and asymmetries, we also include PTA 
members’ GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) to control for their wealth. Similar to GDP, 
GDP per capita is the log-transformed average of a given PTA’s members. All GDP-related 
variables are calculated based World Bank (2020) data.  
Besides countries’ differences in their economic size, we also follow the literature and account 
for differences in their political system. The Polity variable is calculated based on data available 
from the Center for Systemic Peace (2020) and corresponds to the average score of a given 
PTA’s parties. While we include this variable primarily to control for countries’ different 
political systems, we do expect that more democratic countries are more willing to commit to 
cooperation in the area of digital trade in their PTAs as democracies generally trust each other 
more and embrace liberal rules (Mansfield et al., 2002). In line with existing literature, we also 
control for the number of countries that are part of a PTA (PTA Members). A priori, we do not 
have strong expectations on whether PTA Members is negatively or positively associated with 
the degree of cooperation. On the one hand, a larger number of PTA Members may struggle to 
agree on digital trade-related topics and therefore only commit to little cooperation. On the 
other hand, the negotiators may have to include many digital trade-related provisions to make 
sure that each PTA member’s interest has been addressed. Finally, we control for the depth of 
cooperation that countries have agreed in previous PTAs. This variable takes into account the 
importance of boilerplate language (Allee and Elsig, 2019; Milewicz et al., 2019) and overall 
PTA ambitiousness that is rarely lowered from one PTA to the next. Therefore, the level of 
commitment in one PTA may be strongly influenced by preceding PTAs. The variable DESTA 
Depth Previous is calculated based on Dür et al. (2014) and  averaged over a given PTA’s 
parties.11  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent, explanatory and control variables 
outlined above. 
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
Our three dependent variables of interest (Depth, Weighted Depth and Rasch Depth) are non-
binary ordinal variables. In line with the recent literature (Allee and Elsig, 2016; Baccini et al., 
2015), we therefore estimate a series of ordered probit models. As previously mentioned, the 
unit of analysis is at the PTA level, leaving us with a total number of 347 observations. 
Accordingly, all explanatory and control variables are aggregated to the PTA level as described 
above. To address endogeneity concerns, and in line with the literature, the explanatory and 
control variables are lagged by one year.12 To account for time and regional factors, we include 
time and region fixed effects in all our models similar to Allee and Elsig (2016), and use 
clustered standard errors at the PTA level. We also run a number of robustness checks outlined 
in more detail in the next section. 
 
5 Results 
We present our empirical findings in Table 2. Models 1-3 show the results for the dependent 
variable Depth, while models 4-6 and models 7-9 show the results for the dependent variables 
Weighted Depth and Rasch Depth, respectively. We find that Members’ interventions in digital 
trade-related discussions in the respective WTO Councils are positively and statistically 
significantly associated with the three different measures of depth. These results support our 
first hypothesis that the more active WTO Members are in digital trade-related discussions at 
the WTO, the more likely these WTO Members commit to deeper cooperation through PTAs. 
Our empirical results also suggest that a higher share of ITA participants among the PTA 
parties (ITA Members Percent) is positively and statistically significantly associated with the 
three different measures of depth. These results confirm our second hypothesis that ITA 
participants are indeed more likely to commit to deeper digital trade-related cooperation in 
their PTAs. These results are robust to the inclusion of PTAs’ share of WTO Members (WTO 
Members Percent). 
[Insert Table 2 about here.] 
The results shown in Table 2 further confirm that countries which trade digital trade-related 
products, are more likely to commit to deeper cooperation in this area in their PTAs. Similarly, 
we find a positive and statistically significant association between countries’ share of internet 
users and the probability of including deeper provisions on digital trade-related cooperation. 
Finally, our empirical results suggest that US PTAs are more likely to include deeper digital-
trade related provisions. Interestingly, we do not find a statistically significant coefficient for 
EU and Chinese PTAs. This finding might be due to the different strategies the three actors 
pursue when it comes to governing digital trade and trade flows. The US, for instance, does so 
through PTAs while the EU trades access to personal data in exchange for regulatory 
harmonization based on an “adequacy” evaluation by the European Commission.13 China is 
known to only include limited aspirational language in its PTAs (Aaronson and Leblond, 2018; 
Gao, 2018). 
As to our battery of control variables, we find no consistent statistical evidence that economic 
size, wealth or power asymmetries matter for the extent of digital trade-related cooperation. 
Similarly, our results suggest that PTA cooperation in the digital sphere is not statistically 
significantly related to countries’ political system. Finally, we neither find a statistically 
significant association between the number of PTA members and the depth of cooperation nor 
between countries’ past and current cooperation commitments. 
Since the results shown in Table 2 are based on ordered probit models, only the statistical 
significance and sign can be interpreted. In order to add further insights, we also calculate the 
predicted probabilities below. To facilitate illustration, we split the Depth variable into 
quartiles to present shallow, medium shallow, medium deep and deep digital trade-related 
cooperation. Furthermore, we create binary indicators for our explanatory variables of interest 
- WTO Ecommerce Interventions and ITA Members Percent. WTO Ecommerce Binary and ITA 
Members Binary are equal to one for observations that are above the respective mean and equal 
to zero otherwise. We re-run the ordered probit models and report the results in Table 3 and 
Table 4 in the Annex. Table 5 and Table 6 show the predicted probabilities. We find, for 
instance, that PTAs with WTO e-commerce interventions above the mean, are nine percentage 
points less likely to include shallow cooperation with regards to digital trade (Table 5, Depth 
= 1). At the same time, PTAs with WTO e-commerce interventions above the mean, are seven 
percentage points more likely to include deep cooperation with regards to digital trade (Table 
5, Depth = 4). We also find that PTAs in which more than 62 percent (the mean) of PTA parties 
are ITA participants, are ten percentage points less likely to include shallow cooperation with 
regards to digital trade (Table 6, Depth = 1) and eight percentage points more likely to include 
deep cooperation with regards to digital trade (Table 6, Depth = 4). These results are robust to 
changing the cut-off point for the binary variable ITA Members Binary to a potentially more 
intuitive value of 50 percent. 
[Insert Table  5 about here.] 
[Insert Table 6 about here.] 
We also perform a number of robustness checks. First, we run a probit model on a binary 
outcome variable which is equal to one if a PTA has at least one digital trade- related provision 
and equal to zero otherwise. The results (Annex, Table 7) indicate that the share of ITA 
participants among the PTA parties is the driving factor behind the decision of whether to 
address digital trade-related topics in the PTA at all. We also find that the share of countries’ 
internet users is statistically significant in this context while countries’ participation in the 
digital trade-related discussions at the WTO does not appear to play a statistically significant 
role. We do find, however, that participation in WTO discussions on digital trade is statistically 
significant and positive when we re-run the ordered probit models on a sub-sample of PTAs 
that include at least one digital trade- related provision (Annex, Table 8). These findings point 
towards a selection process that we leave to future research to address. Finally, we re-run the 
ordered probit models and include the size of countries’ WTO missions in Geneva.  Previous 
research by Wüthrich and Elsig (2019) suggests that countries’ legal and negotiation capacity 
is related to the design of their PTAs. We find that the results for our two explanatory variables 
of interest are robust to the inclusion of this variable (Annex, Table 9). However, what we can 
see is that the sheer presence in Geneva has no impact on PTA design in the area of digital 
trade rules. 
 
6 Conclusion 
This article has focused on the regime complexity literature related to trade with a special focus 
on how interaction in the multilateral regime spills over to the preferential regime. Focusing 
on a more recent trade topic (digital trade), we find that countries which actively participate in 
digital trade-related discussions at the WTO are more likely to negotiate ambitious digital 
trade-related commitments in their PTAs. Similarly, our analysis suggests that countries which 
participate in the WTO-based plurilateral ITA are more likely to agree to deeper cooperation 
on digital trade in their PTAs. Our results further indicate that trade in IT products, domestic 
policies and having the US as a PTA party also impact PTA design in the area of digital trade. 
Indeed, the analysis suggests that countries that have a competitive advantage in IT-related 
goods and services trade and that build on established domestic digital trade policies are 
pushing for deeper commitments. 
Future research should focus in more detail at how the work within Committees not only re-
enforces the views of some countries’ positions vis-à-vis digital trade but also how over time 
it affects WTO Members without strong views on digital trade policies. With other words, more 
attention to deliberation effects could yield additional insights as to how WTO Members use 
WTO Committees to advocate their established policies and how Committee work feeds into 
national policies by influencing the digital policies approaches. In addition, the conjectured 
effect from signing a plurilateral agreement in the WTO could be further investigated. In 
particular, signing a multilateral agreement could temper domestic opposition and veto powers 
when signing PTA commitments that are deepening existing WTO commitments. Finally, in 
order to make more explicit statements about causality, an instrumental variable could be 
explored in future work. 
What are further implications of our findings for global trade governance? The article shows 
that many avenues are impacting on PTA negotiations and the WTO is one of them. Whether 
this leads to more fragmentation or more coherence in this specific domain of digital trade 
remains to be seen, but clearly some rule-makers (e.g. the US) are getting their preferred 
policies reflected in PTAs. So for the US, the WTO’s work is rather complementing its efforts 
questioning once more the current US Administration’s mantra that the WTO has been bad for 
the US.  
Given that the EU, China and others pursue different agendas on digital trade, it can well be 
that e-commerce debates in the WTO will get more politicized over time as the channel is 
important for the rule-makers to influence the evolving PTA networks. Together with new 
debates about national security when it comes to data policies, this is bad news for finding 
consensus in WTO e-commerce negotiations that are ongoing. 
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Tables and figures 
Figure 1: Evolution of digital trade-related cooperation in PTAs, 2000-2019 
 
  
Figure 2: Operationalizing Depth 
 
Figure 3: Digital trade-related interventions at the WTO, 1998-2018 
 
  
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Depth 11.608 17.948 0 74 
Depth_Weighted 9.236 14.526 0 62.5 
Depth_Rasch 4.487 7.535 0 34.854 
WTO_Ecommerce_Interventions 44.801 59.185 0 419 
ITA_Members_Percent 62.088 37.730 0 100 
WTO_Members_percent 87.935 24.334 0 100 
ITA_Trade 23.061 2.267 15.679 27.223 
Internet_Users 34.378 25.875 .348 89.273 
US .048 .216 0 1 
EU .112 .316 0 1 
CHN .057 .233 0 1 
GDP 26.278 1.718 20.223 30.118 
GDP_Capita 9.3444 1.103 5.925 11.300 
GDP_Asymmetry 26.087 4.980 0 30.446 
Polity 5.808 4.375 -9 10 
PTA_members 3.481 3.124 1 26 
DESTA_Depth_Previous 4.762 1.816 0 7 
N 347 
Table 2: Results from ordered probit models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
VARIABLES Depth Depth Depth Weighted Depth Weighted Depth Weighted Depth Rasch Depth Rasch Depth Rasch Depth 
          
WTO_Ecommerce_Interventions 0.00425* 0.00412 0.00438* 0.00470* 0.00462* 0.00483* 0.00467* 0.00456* 0.00481** 
 (0.00256) (0.00251) (0.00259) (0.00270) (0.00265) (0.00273) (0.00243) (0.00238) (0.00245) 
ITA_Members_Percent 0.00703** 0.00664**  0.00695** 0.00671**  0.00647** 0.00615**  
 (0.00278) (0.00263)  (0.00273) (0.00261)  (0.00281) (0.00266)  
WTO_Members_Percent -0.00199  0.00130 -0.00120  0.00205 -0.00161  0.00140 
 (0.00393)  (0.00372) (0.00394)  (0.00375) (0.00395)  (0.00372) 
ITA_Trade 0.151** 0.144** 0.191*** 0.142* 0.138* 0.182** 0.149** 0.143** 0.186** 
 (0.0725) (0.0705) (0.0721) (0.0724) (0.0706) (0.0717) (0.0730) (0.0709) (0.0727) 
Internet_Users 0.0158** 0.0161** 0.0148** 0.0150** 0.0152** 0.0140* 0.0157** 0.0159** 0.0147** 
 (0.00732) (0.00732) (0.00721) (0.00729) (0.00730) (0.00718) (0.00732) (0.00732) (0.00722) 
US 0.889* 0.935* 1.048** 1.149** 1.177** 1.308** 0.935* 0.972** 1.083** 
 (0.507) (0.491) (0.499) (0.518) (0.506) (0.509) (0.503) (0.489) (0.497) 
EU 0.103 0.0938 0.175 0.147 0.142 0.219 0.112 0.105 0.179 
 (0.253) (0.250) (0.253) (0.258) (0.256) (0.259) (0.248) (0.246) (0.249) 
CHN 0.0438 0.0354 0.114 0.0470 0.0420  0.0707 0.0639 0.136 
 (0.327) (0.327) (0.315) (0.321) (0.321)  (0.321) (0.321) (0.310) 
GDP -0.132 -0.129 -0.199** -0.141 -0.139 -0.207** -0.134 -0.131 -0.195* 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.0999) (0.103) (0.103) (0.100) (0.102) (0.102) (0.100) 
GDP_Asymmetry -0.00217 -0.00271 0.000179 -0.00351 -0.00384 -0.00117 -0.00181 -0.00225 0.000338 
 (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0129) (0.0127) (0.0128) (0.0130) 
GDP_Capita 0.00507 -0.00138 0.0552 0.0239 0.0201 0.0734 0.00591 0.000733 0.0522 
 (0.151) (0.152) (0.144) (0.150) (0.151) (0.143) (0.151) (0.152) (0.145) 
Polity 0.00229 0.00202 0.00843 0.00332 0.00317 0.00933 0.000962 0.000749 0.00671 
 (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0209) (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0210) (0.0219) (0.0218) (0.0211) 
PTA_Members -0.00497 -0.00540 -0.0214 -0.00616 -0.00642 -0.0223 -0.00336 -0.00371 -0.0184 
 (0.0295) (0.0294) (0.0280) (0.0295) (0.0294) (0.0280) (0.0292) (0.0291) (0.0278) 
DESTA_Depth_Previous -0.0471 -0.0510 -0.0289 -0.0500 -0.0524 -0.0320 -0.0503 -0.0535 -0.0337 
 (0.0676) (0.0668) (0.0673) (0.0687) (0.0679) (0.0682) (0.0679) (0.0670) (0.0678) 
          
Observations 347 347 347 347 347 347 347 347 347 
Time FE Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Region FE Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Model Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Table 3: Results from ordered probit model on WTO_Ecommerce_Binary 
 
 Model 10 
VARIABLES Depth 
  
WTO_Ecommerce_Binary 0.310* 
 (0.186) 
ITA_Members_Percent 0.00901*** 
 (0.00292) 
WTO_Members_Percent -0.000490 
 (0.00407) 
ITA_Trade 0.124 
 (0.0781) 
Internet_Users 0.0182** 
 (0.00814) 
US 1.562*** 
 (0.501) 
EU 0.0549 
 (0.240) 
CHN 0.0252 
 (0.361) 
GDP -0.115 
 (0.107) 
GDP_Asymmetry -0.0143 
 (0.0142) 
GDP_Capita -0.0109 
 (0.160) 
Polity -0.00345 
 (0.0225) 
PTA_Members -0.0154 
 (0.0304) 
DESTA_Depth_Previous -0.0565 
 (0.0737) 
  
Observations 347 
Time FE Included 
Region FE Included 
Model Ordered Probit 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Table 4: Results from ordered probit model on ITA_Members_Binary 
 
 Model 11 
VARIABLES Depth 
  
WTO_Ecommerce_Interventions 0.00536** 
 (0.00230) 
ITA_Members_Binary 0.343* 
 (0.192) 
WTO_Members_Percent 0.000783 
 (0.00400) 
ITA_Trade 0.169** 
 (0.0772) 
Internet_Users 0.0174** 
 (0.00808) 
US 1.258** 
 (0.608) 
EU 0.213 
 (0.264) 
CHN 0.170 
 (0.355) 
GDP -0.211** 
 (0.104) 
GDP_Asymmetry -0.0110 
 (0.0145) 
GDP_Capita 0.00840 
 (0.157) 
Polity -0.00259 
 (0.0223) 
PTA_Members -0.0360 
 (0.0285) 
DESTA_Depth_Previous -0.0530 
 (0.0734) 
  
Observations 347 
Time FE Included 
Region FE Included 
Model Ordered Probit 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Table 5: Predicted probabilities – WTO Ecommerce Interventions 
WTO_Ecommerce_Binary 
Depth 
1 2 3 4 
0 .4869484 .0686194 .2266821 .21775 
1 .3986938 .0676239 .2436473 .290035 
 
Table 6: Predicted probabilities – ITA Membership 
ITA_Members_Binary 
Depth 
1 2 3 4 
0 .5102958 .0701743 .2221806 .1973493 
1 .4065985 .0704895 .2488775 .2740345 
 
  
Table 7: Results from a probit model on binary TAPED indicator 
 
 Model 12 
VARIABLES TAPED 
  
WTO_Ecommerce_Interventions 0.00214 
 (0.00238) 
ITA_Members_Percent 0.0117*** 
 (0.00312) 
WTO_Members_Percent -0.00144 
 (0.00436) 
ITA_Trade 0.0754 
 (0.0900) 
Internet_Users 0.0199** 
 (0.00966) 
US 0.569 
 (0.553) 
EU -0.230 
 (0.310) 
CHN 0.315 
 (0.410) 
GDP -0.0399 
 (0.125) 
GDP_Asymmetry -0.0182 
 (0.0204) 
GDP_Capita -0.0238 
 (0.176) 
Polity 0.0287 
 (0.0240) 
PTA_Members -0.0201 
 (0.0290) 
DESTA_Depth_Previous -0.106 
 (0.0847) 
Constant 24.31 
 (65.08) 
  
Observations 347 
Time FE YES 
Region FE YES 
Model Probit 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 8: Results from ordered probit models on TAPED PTAs 
 
 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
VARIABLES Depth Depth Depth Weighted Depth Weighted Depth Weighted Depth Rasch Depth Rasch Depth Rasch Depth 
          
WTO_Ecommerce_Interventions 0.00582* 0.00576* 0.00586* 0.00638* 0.00632* 0.00641* 0.00684** 0.00683** 0.00687** 
 (0.00345) (0.00341) (0.00344) (0.00366) (0.00361) (0.00365) (0.00336) (0.00332) (0.00334) 
ITA_Members_Percent -0.00339 -0.00366  -0.00246 -0.00275  -0.00551 -0.00555*  
 (0.00350) (0.00308)  (0.00348) (0.00306)  (0.00362) (0.00322)  
WTO_Members_Percent -0.00142  -0.00325 -0.00151  -0.00285 -0.000166  -0.00311 
 (0.00502)  (0.00423) (0.00491)  (0.00415) (0.00503)  (0.00427) 
ITA_Trade 0.337*** 0.332*** 0.322*** 0.278*** 0.272*** 0.267*** 0.356*** 0.356*** 0.331*** 
 (0.0837) (0.0802) (0.0848) (0.0771) (0.0735) (0.0778) (0.0813) (0.0780) (0.0822) 
Internet_Users 0.00326 0.00339 0.00324 0.00103 0.00118 0.00107 0.00514 0.00516 0.00514 
 (0.00970) (0.00971) (0.00969) (0.00960) (0.00962) (0.00957) (0.00940) (0.00944) (0.00945) 
US 1.085* 1.096* 1.040* 1.432** 1.443** 1.397** 1.197** 1.199** 1.121* 
 (0.574) (0.573) (0.575) (0.581) (0.579) (0.582) (0.587) (0.587) (0.587) 
EU 0.541 0.536 0.531 0.617* 0.611* 0.609* 0.579* 0.579* 0.562* 
 (0.340) (0.338) (0.341) (0.352) (0.349) (0.353) (0.336) (0.332) (0.338) 
CHN -0.239 -0.248 -0.233 -0.250 -0.261 -0.246 -0.194 -0.195 -0.187 
 (0.400) (0.396) (0.403) (0.390) (0.386) (0.392) (0.390) (0.385) (0.394) 
GDP -0.428*** -0.422*** -0.412*** -0.398*** -0.391*** -0.388*** -0.460*** -0.459*** -0.433*** 
 (0.142) (0.136) (0.143) (0.130) (0.123) (0.132) (0.145) (0.138) (0.146) 
GDP_Asymmetry 0.0425** 0.0421** 0.0414** 0.0301** 0.0295** 0.0296** 0.0490*** 0.0490*** 0.0472*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0133) (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0180) (0.0178) (0.0177) 
GDP_Capita 0.215 0.209 0.206 0.268 0.261 0.260 0.170 0.169 0.152 
 (0.186) (0.183) (0.186) (0.178) (0.176) (0.178) (0.189) (0.188) (0.190) 
Polity -0.0481 -0.0483 -0.0500 -0.0483 -0.0486 -0.0495 -0.0575* -0.0575* -0.0607* 
 (0.0323) (0.0323) (0.0329) (0.0315) (0.0315) (0.0317) (0.0341) (0.0342) (0.0353) 
PTA_Members -0.0131 -0.0129 -0.00702 -0.0156 -0.0154 -0.0112 -0.00351 -0.00348 0.00625 
 (0.0455) (0.0454) (0.0459) (0.0422) (0.0421) (0.0424) (0.0391) (0.0389) (0.0394) 
DESTA_Depth_Previous 0.0132 0.0121 0.00599 0.0158 0.0148 0.0104 0.00663 0.00650 -0.00437 
 (0.0717) (0.0716) (0.0736) (0.0756) (0.0755) (0.0768) (0.0772) (0.0772) (0.0796) 
          
Observations 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 
Time FE Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Region FE Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Model Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Table 9: Results from ordered probit models including WTO_Mission_Size 
 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 
VARIABLES Depth Depth Depth Weighted Depth Weighted Depth Weighted Depth Rasch Depth Rasch Depth Rasch Depth 
          
WTO_Ecommerce_Interventions 0.00415 0.00409 0.00432* 0.00460* 0.00458* 0.00477* 0.00456* 0.00454* 0.00481** 
 (0.00260) (0.00256) (0.00262) (0.00273) (0.00270) (0.00275) (0.00246) (0.00242) (0.00245) 
ITA_Members_Percent 0.00767*** 0.00752***  0.00751*** 0.00748***  0.00716*** 0.00711***  
 (0.00275) (0.00264)  (0.00272) (0.00263)  (0.00277) (0.00265)  
WTO_Members_Percent -0.000845  0.00239 -0.000187  0.00299 -0.000300  0.00140 
 (0.00403)  (0.00383) (0.00403)  (0.00387) (0.00406)  (0.00372) 
WTO_Mission_Size -0.0434 -0.0442* -0.0336 -0.0383 -0.0385 -0.0287 -0.0490* -0.0493*  
 (0.0272) (0.0265) (0.0269) (0.0273) (0.0266) (0.0271) (0.0273) (0.0266)  
ITA_Trade 0.172** 0.170** 0.210*** 0.161** 0.160** 0.198*** 0.173** 0.172** 0.186** 
 (0.0737) (0.0723) (0.0736) (0.0735) (0.0722) (0.0732) (0.0742) (0.0728) (0.0727) 
Internet_Users 0.0179** 0.0181** 0.0164** 0.0169** 0.0169** 0.0153** 0.0180** 0.0181** 0.0147** 
 (0.00753) (0.00752) (0.00734) (0.00748) (0.00747) (0.00729) (0.00759) (0.00756) (0.00722) 
US 0.721 0.737 0.928* 1.005** 1.008** 1.208** 0.749 0.755 1.083** 
 (0.496) (0.487) (0.488) (0.507) (0.501) (0.498) (0.491) (0.484) (0.497) 
EU -0.0689 -0.0758 0.0471 -0.00433 -0.00585 0.110 -0.0820 -0.0845 0.179 
 (0.269) (0.263) (0.269) (0.272) (0.267) (0.272) (0.268) (0.262) (0.249) 
CHN -0.00405 -0.00888 0.0833 0.00463 0.00359 0.0899 0.0171 0.0154 0.136 
 (0.324) (0.324) (0.313) (0.319) (0.319) (0.308) (0.318) (0.318) (0.310) 
GDP -0.0609 -0.0579 -0.148 -0.0782 -0.0775 -0.163 -0.0529 -0.0518 -0.195* 
 (0.106) (0.104) (0.103) (0.106) (0.104) (0.103) (0.107) (0.105) (0.100) 
GDP_Asymmetry -0.00654 -0.00687 -0.00312 -0.00738 -0.00745 -0.00399 -0.00676 -0.00688 0.000338 
 (0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0127) (0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0128) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0130) 
GDP_Capita -0.0624 -0.0664 0.00636 -0.0360 -0.0369 0.0314 -0.0700 -0.0715 0.0522 
 (0.159) (0.159) (0.149) (0.158) (0.158) (0.148) (0.161) (0.161) (0.145) 
Polity 0.00603 0.00596 0.0118 0.00660 0.00659 0.0122 0.00531 0.00529 0.00671 
 (0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0213) (0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0213) (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0211) 
PTA_Members -0.00450 -0.00466 -0.0219 -0.00569 -0.00572 -0.0227 -0.00260 -0.00266 -0.0184 
 (0.0294) (0.0294) (0.0279) (0.0294) (0.0294) (0.0278) (0.0291) (0.0291) (0.0278) 
DESTA_Depth_Previous -0.0274 -0.0286 -0.0124 -0.0324 -0.0327 -0.0178 -0.0280 -0.0285 -0.0337 
 (0.0689) (0.0684) (0.0682) (0.0702) (0.0698) (0.0693) (0.0693) (0.0688) (0.0678) 
          
Observations 347 347 347 347 347 347 347 347 347 
Time FE Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Region FE Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Model Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Notes 
1 We recognize the different definitions of electronic commerce and digital trade. The World Trade Organization (WTO) defines electronic commerce as the “production, 
distribution, marketing, sale or delivery of goods and services by electronic means”. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines digital 
trade as “digitally-enabled transactions of trade in goods and services that can either be digitally or physically delivered, and that involve consumers, firms, and 
governments”. For readability, we use the terms interchangeably in this article. 
2 Although plurilateral negotiations on e-commerce have been recently re-started in Geneva and led to the Joint Statement Initiative on Electronic Commerce. 
3 In the EU-Japan trade agreement, for instance, there is a side letter which suggest that the EU accepts Japanese data protection laws as equivalent. 
4 See also Wu (2017) on lack of WTO progress. 
5 Wunsch-Vincent and Hold (2016), for instance, study 26 EU, US and Asian PTAs signed between 2000 and 2011 and find pronounced differences in the respective PTA 
templates. In a more recent study by Wu (2017), this observation is confirmed based on a detailed analysis of 90 WTO-notified PTAs signed between 2001 and 2016. 
6 This concept is about non-discriminatory treatment of electronic transactions or services in respect to technological means used. E-mail exchange with former Swiss 
negotiator on e-commerce (19 December 2019). 
7 To compute the Rasch indicator, we follow the official Stata guide (available from https://www.stata.com/support/faqs/statistics/rasch-model/). 
8 The World Bank presents an alternative source of data to proxy for digital trade flows. The relevant data includes information on countries’ information and 
communication technology (ICT) service exports (in US$ and as percentage of service exports) and ICT goods exports and imports (as percentage of total goods exports and 
imports).  As one of our principal explanatory variables is related to the ITA, however, we base our empirical analysis on the ITA Trade indicator. Substituting the ITA Trade 
indicator with the World Bank data does not change the main empirical results. 
9 We would like to thank one reviewer for pointing us towards checking this correlation. 
10 The current coding does not allow to differentiate an EU from a US model based on the commitment levels. We assume commitments to be different, but deep in both 
cases. 
11 Substituting the more general DESTA Depth Previous variable with PTA members’ previous depth for cooperation in digital trade does not change the main empirical 
results. 
12 The results are robust to changing the lag to two or three years. We choose a one year lag to limit the loss of observations. 
13 We would like to thank one reviewer for encouraging us to address this point. 
                                                            
